This paper proposes a generic approach for providing enhanced security to communication systems which encode their data for reliability before encrypting it through a stream cipher for security. We call this counter-intuitive technique the encoding-encryption paradigm, and use as motivating example the standard for mobile telephony GSM. The enhanced security is based on a dedicated homophonic or wire-tap channel coding that introduces pure randomness, combined with the randomness of the noise occurring over the communication channel. Security evaluation regarding recovery of the secret key employed in the keystream generator is done through an information theoretical approach.
Introduction
Most communication systems take into account not only the reliability but also the security of the data they transmit. This is particularly true in wireless environment, where the data is inherently more sensible to security threats. Consequently, the design of such systems need to include both coding schemes for providing error-correction and ciphering algorithms for encryption-decryption. It is common practice to first encrypt the data to ensure its safety, and then to encode it for reliability. In this paper, we consider the reverse scenario, namely systems which first encode the data, and then encrypt it, which we call the encoding-encryption paradigm.
Though counter-intuitive at first, there are actually many real life applications where the encoding encryption paradigm is used. A famous illustrative example is the most widespread standard for mobile telephony GSM, standing for "Global System for Mobile Communications" (see [2] and [1] , for the coding, respectively security details). In the GSM protocol, the data is first encoded using an error-correction code so as to why we have a small margin of freedom in designing the security scheme, since we cannot touch most of the existing components of the system. Summary of the Results. This paper proposes and analyzes from the information-theoretic point of view the security of communications systems based on the encoding-encryption paradigm under passive and active attacks, when equipped with an additional wire-tap encoder. We show that with the aid of a dedicated wire-tap encoder, the amount of uncertainty that the adversary must face about the secret key given all the information he could gather during different passive or active attacks he can mount, is a decreasing function of the sample available for cryptanalysis. This means that the wire-tap encoder can indeed provide an information theoretical security level over a period of time, but after a large enough sample is collected the function tends to zero, entering a regime in which a computational security analysis is needed for estimation of the resistance against the secret key recovery.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2, we start by describing precisely the system model together with its security enhanced version and we dedicate Subsection 2.2 to the design of the wire-tap encoder. The security analysis is done in two parts: first the passive adversary is studied in Section 3, while the active one is investigated in Section 4. Practical implications of the given security analysis and some guidelines for design of security enhanced encoding-encryption based systems are pointed out in Section 5. Concluding remarks including some directions for future work are given in Section 6.
System Model and Wiretap Coding
We consider a class of communication systems which, to provide both reliability and security, employs the encoding and then encryption paradigm, namely: the message is first encoded, and then encrypted using a stream ciphering. The detailed model is shown in Figure 1 . The transmitter first encodes a binary message/plain text
that maps a m-dimensional plain text to an n-dimensional encoded message, n > m. The encryption is done using a keystream generator, which takes as input the secret key k of the transmitter, and outputs
as the message to be sent over the noisy channel, where ⊕ denotes XOR or modulo 2 addition. We denote the noise vector by
where each v i is the realization of a random variable V i such that Pr(V i = 1) = p and Pr(V i = 0) = 1 − p. Upon reception of the corrupted encrypted binary sequence of ciphertext
the receiver who shares the secret key k with the transmitter can decrypt first the message
and then decode a despite of the noise thanks to the error-correction code. We remark that in practice a keystream generator can be considered as a finite state machine whose initial state is determined by the secret key and some public data. For simplicity, and because it does not affect our analysis, we can ignore the existence of the known data, and focus on the secret key. In this setting the output of the keystream generator is determined uniquely by the secret key, and it is enough to assume that the transmitter and receiver only share the key. Note further that the trick of reversing the order of encryption and error-correction would not have been possible if a block cipher was used for encryption, since decryption must be done before removing the channel noise.
We finally assume that there is a noiseless feedback link that connects the receiver to the transmitter, so that the receiver can either acknowledge the reception of the message, or inform of the decoding failure, so as to get the missing message sent back.
Enhanced model
Origins for the construction given in this paper are the approaches for stream ciphers design recently reported in [14, 15] , though the focus of this paper is very different, since its goal is enhancing the security of existing encryption schemes. This difference has a number of implications regarding the security issues and implementation complexity of the scheme.
The construction proposed in this paper employs the following main underlying ideas for enhancing security:
• Involve pure randomness into the coding&ciphering scheme so that the decoding complexity without knowledge of the secret key employed in the system approaches the complexity of the exhaustive search for the secret key.
• Enhance security of the existing stream cipher via joint employment of pure randomness and coding theory, and particularly a dedicated encoding following the homophonic or wire-tap channel encoding approaches.
• Allow a suitable trade-off between the security and the communications rate: Increase the security towards the limit implied by the secret-key length at the expense of a low-moderate decrease of the communications rate.
Regarding the homophonic and wire-tap channel coding, note the following. The main goals of homophonic coding are to provide: (i) multiple substitutions of a given source vector via randomness so that the coded versions of the source vectors appear as realizations of a random source; (ii) recoverability of the source vector based on the given codeword without knowledge of the randomization. The main goals of wire-tap channel coding are: (i) amplification of the noise difference between the main and wire-tap channel via randomness; (ii) a reliable transmission in the main channel and at the same time to provide a total confusion of the wire-tapper who observes the communication in the main channel via a noisy channel (wiretap channel). Accordingly, homophonic coding schemes and wire-tap channel ones have different goals and belong to different coding classes, the source coding and the error-correction ones, but they employ the same underlying ideas of using randomness and dedicated coding for achieving the desired goals.
For enhancing the security we exploit the underlying approaches of universal homophonic coding [12] and generic wire-tap coding when the main channel is error-free (see [20] and [19] , for example). Accordingly, we may say either "homophonic coding" or "wire-tap channel coding" to address the dedicated coding that enhances security. The main feature of the dedicated coding is that the encoding is based on randomness and that the legitimate receiving party who shares a secret key with the corresponding transmitting one can perform decoding without knowledge of the randomness employed for the encoding. For simplicity of the terminology we mainly (but not always) say "wire-tap channel coding" to describe the dedicated coding which provides the enhanced security.
Let C H (·) denote a wiretap or homophonic code encoder. To enhance the security of the system considered, it is added at the transmitter end (see Figure 2 ) involving a vector of pure randomness
that is, each u i is the realization of a random variable U i with distribution Pr(U i = 1) = Pr(U i = 0) = 1/2. Note that C H (·) is invertible. The wiretap encoding is done prior to error-correcting encoding, thus out of the m bits of data to be sent, m − l are replaced by random data, letting actually only l bits
as codeword to be sent. As before, the receiver obtains
and starts with the decryption
He then first decodes C H (a||u).
If the decoding is successful, he computes a using C
−1
H and let the transmitter know he could decode. Otherwise he informs the transmitter than retransmission is required.
Similarly to a linear error-correction code where C ECC can be represented by multiplying the data vector by the generator matrix of the code, we can write C H , following the so-called coset encoding proposed by Wyner [20] , as follows: where
• and G H is a m × m binary matrix corresponding to C H (·).
In words, to each l-bit message a = [a 1 , . . . , a l ] is associated a coset determined by
Though this correspondence is deterministic, a random codeword c is chosen inside the coset by:
A Dedicated Wiretap Encoder
In our scenario, we need to combine wiretap encoding with error-correction encoding, both being linear operations. Recall that the encoded vector at the transmitter is
where a is a l-dimensional data vector, and u is a m − l random vector. Using generic coset coding as discussed above with a (m, m − l) code, we now know that
where G H is an m × m matrix, and thus
where G ECC is an m × n binary generator matrix corresponding to C ECC (·), and G = G H G ECC is an m × n binary matrix summarizing the two successive encodings at the transmitter.
Since G H multiplies the vector [a||u] where a is an l-dimension vector and u an (m − l) dimension vector, it makes sense to write the m × m matrix G H by blocks of size depending on l and m − l:
where
H is an l × l matrix, I m−l denotes the (m − l) × (m − l) identity matrix, and finally G (4) H is an (m − l) × l matrix. Requirements on the matrix G H are:
1. Invertibility. The matrix G H should be an invertible matrix, so that the receiver can decode the wiretap encoding.
2. Security. The matrix G H should map [a||u] so that in the resulting vector each bit of data from a is affected by at least one random bit from u, to make sure that each bit of data is protected.
3. Sparsity. Both the matrices G H and G
−1
H should be as sparse as possible, in order to avoid too much computation and communication overheads.
Since by (4), the m − l last rows of G H form a generator matrix of a (m, m − l) error correction code C in systematic form, it has rank m − l. The first l rows are then obtained by adding linearly independent vectors not in C, thus completing a basis of {0, 1} m , resulting automatically in an invertible matrix. A simple way to do so is to choose G
H ], and G
H has no column with only zeroes (it is a block of an error correction code), we have that indeed each bit of data from a is affected by at least one random bit from u.
The choice of G
H = I l makes the l first rows of G H as sparse as possible.
Example 1 Take m = 4, l = 2 so that m − l = 2, and
Clearly G H is invertible. The error correction code described by rows 3 and 4 is simply the repetition code.
Security against a Passive Adversary
This section analyzes the security of the proposed scheme against a passive adversary, that is an adversary limited to monitoring and recording communications. The system we consider already uses a keystream generator to protect the confidentiality of the data. Thus though a passive adversary may try to still discover confidential messages, more dangerous is an attack against the secret key, which would endanger all the transmissions. Based on what a passive adversary can do, this means mounting a known plaintext attack in order to recover the secret key. In the passive known plaintext attacking scenario, with no enhanced security, the adversary possesses the pair
from which he calculates
He can then use x ⊕ v for further processing in an attempt to recover the key which generated x. We will show how the introduction of the wiretap encoding increases the protection of the key against such attacks.
In what follows, we use as notation that
• u i , random bits used in the wiretap encoder,
• x i , output bits of the keystream generator,
• v i , random components of the additive noise are realizations of certain random variables U i , X i and V i , respectively, i = 1, 2, ..., n. We can further assume that the plaintext is generated randomly, and thus see a i as a realization of a random variable A i as well.
The corresponding vectors of random variables are denoted as follows:
, and
. Recall from (3) and (5) that the received vector at the receiver is given by
is an m × n matrix containing both the wiretap and the error correction encoding.
, so that z can be written componentwise as
and z i appears as the realization of a random variable Z i :
From (6), we have
H ], and we can rewrite the wiretap encoder as
where C H,a and C H,u are the operators for the wiretap encoding restricted to a, resp. u:
H ]. Since the error correcting encoding is also linear, we finally get
The lemma below gives a bound on the resistance of the scheme to a known plain text attack where the adversary knows the pair (a, z).
Lemma 1 The equivocation of the keystream output knowing the plaintext and the received signal can be lower bounded as follows:
Proof. Employing the entropy chain rule, we have that
. Repeating the entropy chain rule but with another decomposition, we further get that
. By combining the two decompositions, we deduce that
We now reformulate H(U m−l |A l , Z n ) and H(V n |A l , U m−l , Z n ). First, using this time (8), we have that
On the other hand, conditioning reduces entropy, namely,
and in order to make explicit the role of the extra randomness brought by the wiretap encoder, we can write that
since X n and V n are mutually independent. Similarly, again using (8) 
we obtain that
which distinguishes the randomness coming from the channel noise and the keystream entrpy.
We are finally left with bounding H(U m−l |A l , X n , Z n ). Recovering U m−l when A l , X n and Z n are given is the decoding problem of removing the noise V n employing the code C ECC with error probability P e . This can be bounded using Fano's inequality:
since by design of the system, we may assume P e = ǫ → 0. This concludes the proof.
The interpretation of the lemma is a bound on the resistance of the scheme to a passive known plain text attack. This clearly depends on two parameters:
• the keystream generator: if the output of the keystream generator has a very high entropy
, then the lemma tells that
• the pure randomness put in the wiretap encoder: if we do not add it in the system, the lemma shows that
that is the information-theoretic security of the keystream depends on the channel noise.
We illustrate this last claim with an example.
Example 2 Consider the case of a known plaintext attack when a = 0. We then have
Without the wiretap encoding, the keystream x i is corrupted and so protected as well by the noise on the channel, while with addition of the wiretap encoder, it is further protected by the pure randomness added.
The special case where the channel is noisefree is detailed in the corollary below. This further illustrates the effect of pure randomness involved in the wire-tap channel coding.
Corollary 1 In a noisefree channel, we have
Proof. Since the channel is noisefree, V = 0 and consequently H(V ) = P e = 0. Lemma 1 can be rewritten as
So far, we have discussed the security of a given keystream generator output, for one instance of transmission. We now move to a more realistic scenario. Transmission takes place over time t = 1, 2, . . ., and the keystream generator uses a secret key (or just a key) K based on which it computes its outputs
in a deterministic way depending on f for a time period of length τ :
Note that f (t) (K) is an expansion of the secret key K via a finite state machine and can be considered as an encoding of |K| bits into a long binary codeword. Correspondingly, we can rewrite the whole system in terms of realizations of random variables that depends on time, over the time interval t = 1, . . . τ :
for the plain text,
for the pure randomness used in the wiretap encoder,
for the channel noise,
for the received signal. Similarly as above, we have
The key K is represented as a vector of random variables drawn independently from a uniform distribution over {0, 1}, so that H(K) = |K|. We further use the following block notations:
We can now state the main theorem of this section, which describes the security of the enhanced system against a passive adversary regarding the secret key recovery. 
Proof.
> 0 is achievable. When τ > 1 grows, we employ the following analysis. By using two different decompositions of H(A τ l , U τ (m−l) , X τ n , V τ n , Z τ n ) via the entropy chain rule as done in Lemma 1, we get
Note that knowing A τ l , Z τ n can be considered as a τ n-length degraded version of a binary codeword with τ (m − ℓ) + |K| information bits which is corrupted by a noise vector V τ n . Indeed, without knowing the key, decoding U τ (m−l) is not possible, so the adversary also needs to try to decode K. Assuming that the decoding error probability of this code is P * e , Fano's inequality implies that
Combining the decoding ability of C ECC with a minimum distance decoding yields a decoding error for the aggregated code of size 2 τ (m−ℓ)+|K| that tends to zero provided long enough codewords, that is P * e → 0, and accordingly H(U τ (m−l) |A τ l , Z τ n ) → 0 when τ is large enough. In a similar manner and employing
the decoding ability of C ECC with a minimum distance decoding as used above implies that
To take care of
we again use a decoding argument, since Z τ n is known. However, it is important to note here that K is known too. Thus even though we look at a block
the knowledge of K makes each block U (t) independent, and thus we can decode each of them separately and the probability of error is P τ e . Fano's equality finally yields
and
since P e = ǫ → 0 by design of C ECC . The above consideration of the cases τ = 1 and τ >> 1 also implies the existence of a threshold τ thres .
The statement is intuitively clear. The security depends on the length |K| of the key noting that this length is fixed in the system. Accordingly, when the keystream generator is used for a period τ that varies, as long as τ < τ thresh , the key is protected by the randomness of the noisy channel and of the wiretap encoder, but that protection cannot last forever if the adversary collects too much data.
Note that all this analysis is true for "realistic channels" where the noise is not uniformly distributed. The uniformly distributed noise in the communication channel makes error-correction infeasible, which explain the assumption in the above theorem. Theorem 1 directly implies the following corollary for noiseless channels.
Corollary 2 When V τ n = 0 and the parameter τ is large enough we have:
4 Security against an Active Adversary
We now consider an active and therefore more powerful adversary. There are many possible scenarios for an active adversary. We assume in this work that 1. he can modify the data on the communication channel, that is, inject controlled noise, 2. he can learn the effect of the modified channel at the receiving side, by listening to the feedback link that tells whether decoding was successful.
Let us be more precise. While the transmitter sends
in an already security enhances setting (2), the receiver sees its noisy version
The active adversary is allowed to inject some extra noise v * over the channel, so that now, the legitimate receiver sees y ⊕ v ′ , where v ′ contains both the noise v coming from the channel and the noise v * controlled by the adversary:
As earlier (Section 2), the receiver first decrypts its message using its secret key and locally generated keystream
and then try to decode z ⊕ x:
under the assumption that the error correcting code can correct the errors introduced by v, so as to get
Because of the extra noise v * , the probability of decoding correctly at the receiver may decrease. In the meantime, the active attacker can listen to the feedback channel so that he knows whether the decoding failed or was successful. His goal is again to find the key. His strategy then consists in adding different noise vectors v * and to observe the feedback channel to see whether the chosen noise made the decoding fail, in order to gather information.
We keep our earlier notation, that is
• a i , bits of the plain text,
• z i , bits of the received message
Now it is shown in the proof of Theorem 1 that every term tends to zero, using a decoding argument, which will hold similarly here, since the knowledge of F d cannot make the decoding more difficult.
Practical Implications and Applications Issues
This section provides a generic discussion of the usefulness and possible applications of the proposed approach.
Implications of the security evaluation
The analysis given in Sections 3 and 4 shows that in systems where the encoding-encryption paradigm is employed, involvement of pure randomness via concatenation of dedicated wire-tap and error-correction coding (instead of error-correction only) provides an increased cryptographic security, by combining pseudorandomness, randomness and coding, which in a known-plaintext cryptanalytic scenario implies an increased resistance against threats on the secret key. The performed information-security evaluation more precisely points out the following desirable security properties of the proposed approach: (i) When the sample available for cryptanalysis is below a certain size, the scheme provides uncertainty about the secret key; (ii) Complexity of the secret key recovery appears as a highly computationally complex problem even if the available sample is such that the posterior uncertainty about the secret key tends to zero. The main consequence of (i) is that even if exhaustive search were to be employed for the secret key recovery, a (large) number of candidates will appear. The statement (ii) is an implication of the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, where the reduction to zero of the posterior uncertainty about the secret key appears assuming employment of a decoding which has complexity proportional to the exhaustive search over all possible secret keys. Accordingly, the uncertainty tends to zero at the expense of a decoding with exponential complexity. Actually, the decrease of the uncertainty about the secret key with the increase of the sample available for cryptanalysis appears as a consequence of decoding capabilities of a low rate random binary block codes, but at the expense of the decoding complexity which is exponential in the secret key length.
The above features (i) and (ii) hold not only in a passive attacking scenario where the attacker performs cryptanalysis based on recording the ciphertext from a public communication channels, but also in certain active attacking scenarios where the attacker can modify the ciphertext and learn the effects of these modifications.
Framework for applications
The encoding-encryption paradigm for secure and reliable communications enjoys the following desirable properties: (i) When the decryption is performed by bitwise XORing the keystream to the ciphertext, an error in a bit before decryption causes an error in the corresponding bit after decryption, without any errorpropagation, and (ii) Provides non-availability of the error-free keystream when the communication channel is a noisy one.
The proposed approach for enhancing the security of the communications systems which follow encodingencryption paradigm could be employed in the design of these systems from scratch as well as in upgrading of the existing ones.
In the case of upgrading the existing systems, the implementation assumption is that the employed, already existing, binary linear block error-correction code (m, n) which encodes m bits into a codeword from GF (2 n ), could be replaced with a binary block code (m ′ , n) with the same error correction capability but with m ′ > m. Accordingly, m ′ − m random bits can be concatenated with m information bits and mapped into the new m-bits via a homophonic encoder. The obtained output from homophonic encoder is the input for the error-correcting one. Taking into account the notation from Section 2, the previous means that instead of performing C ECC (a) which is a linear mapping {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n , the following should be performed: n . On the receiving side, the decoding procedures after decryption are straightforward (see Fig. 2 ): The error correction decoding removes the random errors, and the message a is obtained by truncating of the inverse linear mapping corresponding to the homophonic decoding.
In the case of a design of the encoding-encryption system from the scratch, the design should include a coding box which performs the concatenation of homophonic and error-correction coding in a manner which fits the rate of the concatenated code to the given constraints.
Note that from an implementation point of view, replacement of a linear block encoding by a concatenation of a block linear homophonic and error correction encoding is a replacement of one binary matrix with another binary matrix which is the product of the matrices corresponding to the homophonic and error-correction encoders. Accordingly, the implementation complexity of two concatenated codes could be approximately the same as the implementation complexity of an error correcting code only.
Conclusion
The problem addressed in this paper is the one of enhancing security of certain communications systems which employ error correction encoding of the messages and encryption of the obtained codewords in order to provide both secrecy and reliability of the transmission. This paper yields a proposal for providing the enhanced security of the considered systems employing randomness and dedicated coding and the information-theoretic security evaluation of the proposed approach. The analysis given in this paper implies that in the systems where the encoding-encryption paradigm is employed, the cryptographic security can be enhanced via involvement of a homophonic coding based on pure randomness as follows: Instead of just error-correction encoding before the encryption, this paper proposes employment of a concatenation of linear block homophonic and error-correction encoding. The proposal and its cryptographic security evaluation are given in a generic manner and accordingly yield a generic framework for particular applications.
Note that the information-theoretic consideration of the cryptographic security yields a basic evaluation of the related cryptographic features. On the other hand, the information-theoretic security evaluation also provides specification of the settings when it is possible to perform the secret key recovery, but it does not specify and only indicates the expected complexity of this problem. We show that with the aid of a dedicated wire-tap encoder, the amount of uncertainty that the adversary has about the key given all the information he could gather during different passive or active attacks he can mount, is a decreasing function of the sample available for cryptanalysis. This means that the wire-tap encoder can indeed provide an information theoretical security level over a period of time, after which a large enough sample is collected and the function tends to zero, entering a regime in which a computational security analysis is needed.
An interesting issue for further work is the characterization of the transition region in which the uncertainty drops from a certain value to close to zero. Also, because after all, the uncertainty tends to zero, the computational complexity based evaluation of cryptographic security is a direction for a future work.
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